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Economic Research
May 10, 2019
Global Data Watch
Renewed US-China trade war further threatens struggling goods sector
Trade war could hold global capex growth to zero this year, and damp
China GDP by 0.8%-pt through 2020
Conflict escalation also would amplify easing bias across the globe
Next week: US Apr ret sales (cont. 0.3%) and IP (mfg 0%), China Apr
activity (IP: -1.6), EMU Mar IP (-0.2%)
Just when you thought it was safe
Central to our outlook is a view that a set of headwinds facing the global
goods sector around the turn of the year was diminishing and that this process
would promote a recovery in business sentiment. With the transitory shocks
fading and lingering uncertainties resolving—aided by a strong policy shift
beginning with the Fed going on hold—we looked for a cyclical lift to take
hold around midyear. This week has been a reminder that the fading of transi-
tory shocks has yet to translate into a more fundamental lift that supports a
cyclical pickup in 2H19. Trade flows from Asia are recovering, but the im-
provements lack dynamism. The Euro area looks to have rebounded from the
very weak growth in 2H18 but this week’s industrial data suggest the bounce
has been short-lived and point to downside risk in the current quarter. Most
concerning is that the US-China trade negotiation, which just last week Treas-
ury Secretary Mnuchin indicated was “in its final lap,” took a decisive turn for
the worse. It is too early to countenance forecast revisions as the latest devel-
opments could very well be last-minute negotiating tactics, but it is important
to reassess the possible impact of a full-blown US-China trade war.
Beneath the surface of diminishing headwinds and an intensifying trade war is
a cautiously skeptical business sector. Starting in mid-2018, expectations of
future conditions began to slide even as firms maintained a more upbeat as-
sessment of current conditions (Figure 1). By late last year, sentiment was
falling more broadly. Businesses responded to these fears with slower growth
in investment. Although employment gains remain close to cycle highs, global
capex (ex. China) appears to have stalled after reaching a short-lived expan-
sion high in late 2017. Moreover, the deterioration in business sentiment and
capital spending continues. Our latest tracking shows global business confi-
dence deteriorating through April, completely reversing the recovery from
2016-17. This week’s escalation in the US-China trade war will no doubt
magnify business worries.
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: J.P. Morgan
St.dev from 2000-pres average
Figure 1: DM manufacturing surveys
Expected
Current
0
2
4
6
8
18Q1 18Q3 19Q1 19Q3
%oya. Shaded model output w/ different conf inputs
Figure 2: Global* capex
Source: J.P. Morgan (*Global excl China for data reasons)
Severely adverse
Baseline
Positive
Adverse
Contents
US: Checking in on millennials
16
Mexico: What is core CPI saying
about potential GDP? 20
Australian employ ment grow th:
Bellwethers under pressure 22
Global Economic Outlook Summary
4
Global Central Bank Watch
6
Nowcast of global grow th 7
Selected recent research from J.P.
Morgan Economics 9
The J.P. Morgan View : Markets 10
Data Watches
United States
24
Euro area
30
Japan
34
Canada
36
Mexico
38
Brazil 40
Argentina 42
Chile & Colombia
44
United Kingdom 46
Emerging Europe 48
South Africa & SSA
52
EMEA EM focus
54
Australia and New Zealand
55
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
57
Korea
61
ASEAN
63
India
67
Asia focus
69
Re gional Data Calendars 72
Bruce Kasman
(1-212) 834-5515
bruce.c.kasman@jpmorgan.com
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
David Hensley
(1-212) 834-5516
david.hensley@jpmorgan.com
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
Joseph Lupton
(1-212) 834-5735
joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
www.jpmorganmarkets.com
2
Economic Research
Global Data Watch
May 10, 2019
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
Bruce Kasman (1-212) 834-5515
bruce.c.kasman@jpmorgan.com
David Hensley (1-212) 834-5516
david.hensley@jpmorgan.com
Joseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735
joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
Our previous analysis of the US-China trade war suggested
that the direct impact of the tariffs would be relatively modest
given that the incidence of the “tax” of roughly $125bn (25%
of roughly $500 of US imports from China annually) would
be spread across the supply chain (from Chinese and other
Asian producers, US importers, and US households). We also
assumed significant policy support, particularly from China,
would largely offset the indirect sentiment shock. On net,
although our start-of-year outlook initially projected a full
implementation of the tariffs, we had assumed the impact on
GDP growth this year would be a small 0.1%-pt in the US and
0.3%-pt in China (see here and here). However, the past
year’s performance shows how powerful the indirect effects
might be. Even recognizing that a slide in business expecta-
tions was underway, we underestimated the sharp slowdown
in global capex that took hold in 2H18. The disruptive impact
on China’s supply chain was also a surprise.
The key call is to assess the degree to which sentiment, spend-
ing, and financial markets already reflect the realization of
business sector fears of a more material trade war. The early
signal from markets is that some reversal of the rally in equity
and credit markets will be forthcoming and this will reduce
the fuel available for growth. As sentiment continued to slide
in recent months despite the easing in financial conditions, the
assessment on this front is less clear. To gauge its importance
for the global outlook we turn to our capex model (Figure 2).
The slide in confidence over the past year has damped spend-
ing by nearly 2%-pts. Our outlook projects a modest recovery
in sentiment alongside moderate profit growth to hold capex
growth to a lackluster 2%-3% this year. However, should con-
fidence continue sliding at the same pace as over the past
year, we could see zero global capex growth this year—a rare
event outside recessions.
China wings clipped by trade war
Our assessment of the impact of the trade war earlier this year
was tracking well in China. With negotiations pointing to a
deal and continued robust policy support, we boosted our full-
year GDP growth forecast to 6.5% (4Q/4Q). Although the
Lunar New Year fog has limited our visibility, we’ve viewed
the risks around this call as evenly balanced pending confir-
mation in next week’s April activity reports. However, this
week’s developments threaten the détente.
If the US enacts a new 25% tariff increase on all imports from
China (i.e., 25% not only on the current $200bn but also on
the remaining $300bn of US imports from China), we think
this would reduce Chinese GDP growth by 0.3%-pt in 2019
and 0.5%-pt in 2020. In our view, the economic impact in
2019 will be modest, reflecting that: (1) the tariff hike will
mainly be felt in 2H19 and spill over into 2020; and (2) given
the prolonged trade talks and escalation in the tariff war in
2018, some of the negative impact already has taken place,
which means additional negative impact will be smaller com-
pared to our estimates last year. We think any prospective
policy response is likely to be reactive and fine-tuned, rather
than preemptive. Possible steps could include an accelerated
rollout of fiscal subsidies to support consumption; further
RRR cuts and credit easing; and a weaker CNY, with the
year-end USD/CNY forecast now at 6.80 from 6.65 previous-
ly. In addition, officials have pledged to retaliate against the
US with higher tariffs on US imports.
When the elephants fight, the grass suffers
The Asian supply chain underwent a significant shock late last
year as fears about a US-China trade war reached a climax.
China’s intermediate goods imports plunged, mainly from its
Asian neighbors, as companies rushed to fill orders and draw
down inventories. Recent reports suggested this shock was
unwinding as a trade deal appeared at hand. This week’s trade
report showed Chinese imports rebounded in April to near
their previous high. Correspondingly, we’ve seen gains in
EMAX exports in March, along with consecutive gains in the
regional output PMI, though the advance in IP has been less
impressive while the global new orders PMI for capital goods
took a step back in April (Figure 3). Moreover, this normali-
zation likely will be upended if the US and China engage in a
new round of tariff hikes. Moreover, the entire region is still
coping with weak global capex demand, limiting its growth
prospects.
Vulnerable Japan could defer VAT hike
In Japan the imperial succession and long, 10-day Golden
Week holiday have boosted household spending and tourism.
However, the latest readings on the PMI and consumer confi-
dence remain subdued, suggesting sluggish underlying
growth. Moreover, the country is vulnerable to collateral
damage from the renewed US-China trade dispute. In re-
-30
-18
-6
6
18
30
47
49
51
53
55
57
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
DI, sa (thru Apr '19)
Figure 3: EM Asia ex.-China exports and global capex orders PMI
%3m3m, saar (thru Mar '19)
Source: J.P. Morgan
EMAX
export values
PMI-New orders
(Capital goods)
3
Economic Research
Global Data Watch
May 10, 2019
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
Bruce Kasman (1-212) 834-5515
bruce.c.kasman@jpmorgan.com
David Hensley (1-212) 834-5516
david.hensley@jpmorgan.com
Joseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735
joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
sponse to this week’s escalation, Japan’s equity prices fell and
the JPY appreciated. Further deterioration would weigh on
corporate sentiment. We don’t expect Japan’s policymakers to
react immediately. But if economic conditions continue to
deteriorate, the government could decide to postpone the VAT
hike (from 8% to 10%) scheduled for this October—as a sen-
ior LDP official hinted this week.
EU Parliament elections may doom PM May
The European Parliament elections due to take place May 23-
26 are important for two reasons. First, they will highlight the
increase in support for populists since the last elections in
2014. Our analysis suggests that populist parties will win al-
most 30% of the seats in this year’s elections, up from 22% in
2014. And second, it may be the final straw that ends UK
prime minister May’s term in office. The UK’s participation
in the European Parliament elections is mainly important for
its symbolism. Once the UK leaves the EU, the UK’s mem-
bers of the European Parliament will return home. Our analy-
sis suggests the newly created Brexit Party, which advocates
for a no-deal Brexit, will win 25 seats. We predict the Con-
servative Party will get 10 seats, about half what they
achieved in 2014. Many in the Conservative Party will view
this as a reflection of the frustration that many citizens feel
that the UK has not left the EU yet. If May then resigns, it
will open up the door to a Conservative Party leadership elec-
tion and a new prime minister.
A mostly dovish tilt
The shift to easier projected central bank policies this year
provides an important cushion that is helping to offset linger-
ing business sector concerns (Figure 4). This week’s escalation
in the trade war will encourage central banks to maintain their
accommodative stances wherever market pressures allow it.
This week brought fresh action in EM Asia, where both BNM
and BSP cut ahead of our expectations. In Malaysia, BNM
tightening financial conditions along with ongoing trade ten-
sions prompted the cut. In the Philippines, BSP also highlighted
concerns over global growth while flagging the near-term im-
pact of the budget delays on economic activity. With the BSP
also nudging down its inflation forecast this year, we now look
for two further rate cuts this year. In Thailand, with scant evi-
dence of any regional export upswing, increasing uncertainty
over the trade war, and a committee that appears to see less
urgency to tighten, we are removing our call for hikes this year.
New Zealand’s central bank also lowered rates 25bp this
week. The Bank, having introduced an easing bias at the pre-
vious meeting, was responding to growth and inflation devel-
opments. Although we looked for the RBA to ease as well this
week, officials left rates unchanged despite a particularly
weak CPI report. The new governor delivered fairly vague
guidance that officials are watching the labor market, though
their forecasts show they only expect a very slight fall in un-
employment. We continue to think economic performance
will fall short of the RBA’s forecast though we pushed back
forecasted rate cuts to August and November.
Although the central bank tide is running dovish, there are
exceptions. One group includes those trying to slowly normal-
ize policy from very easy settings against a backdrop of do-
mestic strength. The Norges Bank and the Riksbank are two
examples. Indeed, at this week’s meeting the Norges Bank
signaled plans to hike another 25bp in June despite ongoing
weakness in the Euro area and the renewed uncertainty around
US-China trade. The other group includes a subset of EM coun-
tries that are vulnerable to capital flight, including Turkey,
Mexico, and South Africa, among others. This week the CBRT
responded to the latest lira weakness by tightening lira liquidity.
With domestic political uncertainty likely to linger, and a deep-
er contraction in growth expected this year, we push back our
call for the CBRT to begin cutting from July to September, and
we now see a total of 250bp in cuts (previously 400bp).
Financial stability and inflation concerns also remain promi-
nent in Mexico. At next week’s meeting, Banxico is likely to
remain on hold with rates at an elevated 8.25%. Inflation has
risen above the target range on an upswing in core inflation,
which remains stubbornly high. Brazil’s COPOM kept the
SELIC rate at 6.5% this week with officials seeing balanced
inflation risks as continued uncertainty over reforms is offset-
ting mediocre activity data. Colombia’s BanRep, which
stayed on hold late last week at 4.25%, is maintaining a more
dovish bias notwithstanding inflation drifting up from the
target midpoint and a domestic-demand-led widening of the
current account deficit above 4% of GDP. We think it will be
forced to tighten by September.
Editor: Gabriel de Kock (1-212) 622-6718 gabriel.s.dekock@jpmorgan.com
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
Global US DM ex US EM ex China
Source: J.P. Morgan
Bp; Current vs. Dec 2018 forecast
Figure 4: Policy rate, 2019 forecast revision
4
Economic Research
Global economic outlook sum-
mary
May 10, 2019
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
David Hensley (1-212) 834-5516
david.hensley@jpmorgan.com
Carlton Strong (1-212) 834-5612
carlton.m.strong@jpmorgan.com
Joseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735
joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
Global economic outlook summary
Real GDP
Real GDP
Consumer prices
% over a year ago % over previous period, saar % over a year ago
2018 2019 2020 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 4Q19 2Q18
4Q18
2Q19 4Q19
United States 2.9
2.6
1.8
3.4
2.2
3.2
2.3
1.8
1.8
2.7
2.2
1.9
2.2
Canada 1.8
1.2
1.7
2.0
0.4
0.5
1.0
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.0
2.0
2.0
Latin America 1.2
1.4
↓
2.4
1.5
0.8
0.6
2.7
2.6
2.3
↑
3.5
4.0
4.1
3.5
Argentina -2.5
-1.2
2.5
-2.0
-4.7
2.5
2.5
2.0
1.0
27.1
47.4
57.7
39.8
Brazil 1.1
1.5
2.5
2.2
0.5
0.4
2.8
3.0
2.4
3.3
4.1
4.6
3.7
Chile 4.0
3.3
↓
3.0
0.6
5.3
0.5
↓
5.0
↑
4.0
4.5
↑
2.2
2.4
1.9
2.6
Colombia
2.7
3.4
3.1
3.2
2.4
2.8
4.5
3.5
3.5
3.2
3.3
3.2
↑
3.5
↑
Ecuador 1.4
-0.3
-0.8
3.2
0.3
-1.0
-2.0
-2.0
-2.0
-0.8
0.3
0.3
0.1
Mexico 2.0
1.5
1.7
2.4
1.0
-0.8
1.7
1.8
2.0
4.6
4.8
4.4
↑
3.7
Peru 4.0
3.9
3.6
-2.0
10.4
1.0
4.5
3.0
4.0
0.9
2.1
2.6
2.4
Uruguay 2.0
1.0
1.0
-0.4
-0.5
1.0
1.5
2.5
1.0
7.3
8.0
8.0
7.8
↑
Venezuela -10.0
…
1.0
2.0
…
…
…
…
28250
600000
..
..
Asia/Pacific 4.8
4.5
4.5
3.6
4.6
4.1
4.9
5.2
3.9
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.6
Japan 0.8
0.2
0.6
-2.4
1.9
-1.0
1.0
2.5
-3.5
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.2
Australia 2.8
2.1
2.7
1.1
0.7
2.6
2.4
2.5
3.0
2.1
1.8
1.5
1.9
New Zealand 2.8
2.6
2.6
1.2
2.2
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.4
1.5
1.9
1.4
↓
1.4
↓
EM Asia
6.0
5.7
5.7
5.3
5.6
5.4
↓
6.0
6.0
5.8
2.3
2.2
1.9
1.9
China 6.6
6.4
6.2
6.0
6.1
6.7
6.6
6.6
6.2
1.8
2.2
1.9
1.6
India 7.1
7.2
7.4
6.8
6.7
5.1
6.8
7.5
7.7
4.8
2.6
2.9
3.8
Ex China/India 3.7
3.3
3.5
2.8
3.7
2.4
↓
4.2
3.8
3.8
2.0
2.0
1.6
1.8
Hong Kong 3.0
2.7
2.6
0.4
-1.2
7.5
3.5
2.8
2.0
2.1
2.6
2.8
3.0
Indonesia 5.2
4.9
4.9
4.9
↓
5.4
↓
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.8
3.3
3.2
3.0
2.8
Korea 2.7
2.4
2.6
2.3
3.9
-1.4
5.0
3.2
3.2
1.5
1.8
0.9
1.2
Malaysia 4.7
4.4
4.3
6.7
5.7
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.3
1.3
0.3
1.3
1.8
Philippines 6.2
5.7
↓
6.1
5.9
↓
7.3
↑
3.9
↓
6.0
↓
6.6
↑
6.6
↑
4.8
5.9
2.8
↓
1.5
Singapore 3.2
2.0
3.0
1.4
1.4
2.0
2.8
2.8
3.0
0.3
0.5
1.4
1.6
Taiwan 2.6
1.9
2.1
1.9
1.5
2.0
1.9
2.9
2.7
1.7
0.5
0.3
1.6
Thailand 4.1
3.3
3.8
-1.3
3.3
4.1
3.5
4.5
4.5
1.3
0.8
0.8
1.0
Western Europe 1.8
1.4
1.7
0.9
1.1
1.6
1.4
1.5
1.8
1.9
2.0
1.6
1.4
Euro area 1.8
1.3
1.7
0.6
0.9
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.8
1.7
1.9
1.4
1.3
Germany 1.5
1.0
1.7
-0.8
0.1
1.3
1.8
1.5
1.8
1.9
2.1
1.5
1.2
France 1.6
1.3
1.7
1.2
1.4
1.2
1.3
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.2
1.2
1.1
Italy 0.7
0.0
↓
0.8
-0.5
-0.4
0.9
-1.0
↓
0.5
0.8
1.0
1.5
1.0
0.9
Spain 2.6
2.3
1.9
2.2
2.2
2.8
2.3
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.0
1.1
Norway 2.5
2.3
2.0
1.5
3.7
1.5
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.4
3.4
2.9
1.9
Sweden 2.4
1.8
1.7
-0.4
4.7
1.0
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.1
1.8
2.1
United Kingdom 1.4
1.6
1.6
2.8
0.9
2.0
1.0
1.5
1.8
2.4
2.3
2.2
↓
1.9
↓
EMEA EM 2.9
1.4
↓
2.4
1.4
-0.1
0.7
↑
1.8
↓
2.9
↓
3.2
4.6
7.1
6.9
5.6
Czech Republic 2.9
2.6
2.9
2.8
3.4
2.0
↓
2.6
2.8
2.8
2.3
2.1
2.3
2.3
Hungary
4.9
3.5
2.8
5.8
4.2
5.2
↑
3.2
3.2
3.0
2.7
3.2
3.3
2.5
Israel 3.3
3.3
3.5
2.7
3.0
3.2
3.2
4.1
4.1
0.7
1.1
0.9
1.0
Poland 5.1
3.7
3.5
6.6
2.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.7
1.4
2.3
2.5
Romania 4.1
2.7
1.4
6.9
3.0
0.9
1.7
2.4
2.5
5.3
3.7
3.8
↑
4.3
↑
Russia 2.3
1.5
1.6
1.9
2.0
-0.8
2.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
4.0
5.2
4.6
South Africa 0.8
1.0
1.2
2.6
1.4
-1.2
↑
1.3
2.5
2.5
4.5
4.9
4.6
↑
4.7
Turkey 2.6
-1.7
↓
3.5
-6.1
-9.4
0.1
-0.2
↓
3.2
↓
4.3
12.8
22.4
19.1
13.5
Global 3.2
2.8
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.8
3.0
3.1
2.7
2.4
2.4
2.2
2.1
Developed markets 2.2
1.8
1.6
1.7
1.6
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.2
2.1
2.0
1.6
1.7
Emerging markets 4.7
4.4
4.6
4.1
4.0
3.9
↓
4.9
5.0
4.8
2.8
3.2
3.0
2.7
Global
—
PPP weighted
3.7
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.1
3.6
3.7
3.4
↑
2.6
2.7
2.5
2.4
Note: For some emerging economies seasonally adjusted GDP data are estimated by J.P. Morgan. Bold denotes changes from last edition of Global Data Watch, with arrows show-
ing the direction of changes. Underline indicates beginning of J.P. Morgan forecasts. Unless noted, concurrent nominal GDP weights calculated with current FX rates are used in
computing our global and regional aggregates. Regional CPI aggregates exclude Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela. Regional GDP aggregates exclude Venezuela. Forecasts for
Argentina are based on JPMorgan’s estimates of CPI. Source: J.P. Morgan
5
Economic Research
Global Data Watch
May 10, 2019
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
David Hensley (1-212) 834-5516
david.hensley@jpmorgan.com
Carlton Strong (1-212) 834-5612
carlton.m.strong@jpmorgan.com
Joseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735
joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
G-3 economic outlook detail
2018 2019 2020
2018 2019 2020 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q
United States
Real GDP 2.9 2.6 1.8 3.4 2.2 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Private consumption 2.6 2.3 2.0 3.5 2.5 1.2 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Equipment investment 7.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 6.6 0.2 3.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Non-residential construction 5.0 0.7 3.5 -3.4 -3.9 -0.8 3.0 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5
Intellectual property products 7.5 6.7 3.1 5.6 10.7 8.6 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
Residential construction
-
0.3
-
1.3
1.8
-
3.6
-
4.7
-
2.8
3.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
Inventory change ($ bn saar) 45.0 87.7 76.6 89.8 96.8 128.4 84.2 68.3 70.0 74.2 78.5
Government spending
1.5
2.3
1.7
2.6
-
0.4
2.4
4.5
3.0
1.7
1.3
1.3
Exports of goods and services 4.0 2.2 1.9 -4.9 1.8 3.7 3.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Imports of goods and services
4.5
1.6
3.7
9.3
2.0
-
3.7
2.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
Domestic final sales contribution 2.9 2.4 2.2 3.0 2.1 1.5 3.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1
Inventories contribution 0.1 0.2 -0.1 2.4 0.1 0.6 -1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1
Net trade contribution -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -2.0 -0.1 1.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Consumer prices (%oya) 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.3
Excluding food and energy (%oya)
2.1
2.1
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.3
Core PCE deflator (%oya) 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0
Federal budget balance (% of GDP, FY) -3.8 -4.2 -4.5
Personal saving rate (%) 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Unemployment rate (%) 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3
Industrial production, manufacturing 2.3 1.0 1.3 3.6 1.7 -1.1 0.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2
Euro area
Real GDP 1.8 1.3 1.7 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8
Private consumption 1.3 1.4 1.7 0.4 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Capital investment 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.0 5.3 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Government consumption
1.1
1.4
1.3
0.2
2.7
1.0
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
Exports of goods and services 3.1 3.2 3.0 0.8 4.7 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
Imports of goods and services
3.1
3.6
3.0
4.7
4.4
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
Domestic final sales contribution 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.7 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Inventories contribution 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 1.5 -1.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Net trade contribution 0.1 0.0 0.1 -1.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Consumer prices (HICP, %oya)
1.8
1.3
1.4
2.1
1.9
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.6
1.4
ex food, alcohol and energy 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4
General govt.
budget balance (% of GDP, FY)
-
0.9
-
1.0
Unemployment rate (%) 8.2 7.6 7.1 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.3 7.2
Industrial production 0.9 0.5 2.0 -0.5 -4.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Japan
Real GDP 0.8 0.2 0.6 -2.4 1.9 -1.0 1.0 2.5 -3.5 2.3 1.0
Private consumption
0.4
0.6
0.3
-
0.9
1.6
0.0
1.0
2.5
-
4.5
2.0
1.0
Business investment 3.9 0.0 1.0 -10.0 11.3 -10.0 6.0 5.0 -5.0 3.0 0.5
Residential construction
-
5.8
2.6
-
1.1
2.3
4.6
4.5
5.0
5.0
-
10.0
-
5.0
5.0
Public investment -3.3 0.0 3.7 -8.8 -6.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 8.0 4.0 2.0
Government consumption
0.8
1.0
0.8
0.9
3.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.0
Exports of goods and services 3.1 -0.2 1.6 -5.6 4.0 -5.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Imports of goods and services
3.2
1.5
1.2
-
2.6
11.3
-
7.5
5.0
6.0
-
3.0
1.0
2.0
Domestic final sales contribution 0.7 0.6 0.6 -2.4 3.1 -1.3 1.9 2.6 -3.2 1.9 1.1
Inventories contribution
0.2
-
0.1
-
0.1
0.5
0.1
-
0.2
-
0.6
0.6
-
1.2
0.2
0.1
Net trade contribution 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -1.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.7 0.9 0.2 -0.2
Consumer prices (%oya) 1.0 0.5 0.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
ex food and energy 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
General govt. net lending (% of GDP, CY) -2.7 -2.9 -3.2
Unemployment rate (%)
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
Industrial production 0.9 -0.7 1.9 -5.5 8.3 -10.0 3.0 6.0 -7.0 5.0 4.0
Memo: Global industrial production
2.7 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.1 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.8 2.5
%oya
2.5 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.6 2.6
Note: More forecast details for the G-3 and other countries can be found on J.P. Morgan’s Morgan Markets client web site. Source: J.P. Morgan
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