Research Paper
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara
and Divya Hundlani
Asia-Pacific Programme | March 2020
Chinese Investment
and the BRI in Sri Lanka
Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka
2 | Chatham House
Summary
• China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to greater Chinese outbound
investment in Asia, including in Sri Lanka. This investment has recently come under scrutiny,
due to intensifying geopolitical rivalries in the Indian Ocean as well as Sri Lanka’s prime
location and ports in the region.
• There are claims that by accepting Chinese outbound investment, Sri Lanka risks being
stuck in a ‘debt trap’ and the displacement of its local workers by both legal and illegal Chinese
labour. There are also concerns that Chinese investment has led to environmental damage and
increased security risks for Sri Lanka and the neighbourhood. Furthermore, there is criticism
that institutional weaknesses in Sri Lanka, including a lack of policy planning and transparency,
are resulting in nonperforming infrastructure projects funded by Chinese investment.
• The pattern of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka reveals a nuanced picture of benefits and
costs. Similarly, it shows that a matrix of Sri Lankan, Chinese and multilateral policies are
required to maximize the benefits and minimize any risks of Chinese investment. Sri Lanka is
not in a Chinese debt trap. Its debt to China amounts to about 6 per cent of its GDP. However,
Sri Lanka’s generally high debt levels show the country needs to improve its debt management
systems. This step would also reduce any risk of a Chinese debt trap in the future.
• Specific projects have contributed positively to Sri Lanka’s economy. Some have brought
greater benefits than others, such as the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT),
which has allowed the Colombo port to grow at a rapid pace. However, imports from China for
projects in Sri Lanka have widened the trade deficit between the two countries. In addition,
there have been only limited economic spillovers for Sri Lanka, including knowledge transfer
in the local labour force.
• The number of Chinese workers in Sri Lanka is rising but remains a very small percentage of
the total labour force. While illegal migration is a concern, there are significantly fewer illegal
residents from China than from neighbouring countries. Sri Lanka has relatively strong rules on
outward migration but can better regulate inward migration based on labour market demands
and economic priorities.
• The environmental implications of Chinese investment projects in Sri Lanka are mixed. While
earlier projects were more harmful, recent projects such as the CICT and Port City in Colombo
have adapted to stricter environmental standards. To ensure consistently high environmental
standards, Sri Lanka should strengthen its domestic regulations and seek more investments
from green-friendly partners.
• Concerns that China will use ports and other projects for military purposes are, in part, driven
by geopolitical anxieties. In response, Sri Lanka has strengthened its naval presence at the
Hambantota port. Continual oversight by technical experts is required to guard against security-
related concerns and ensure public trust in the projects. Such trust will also grow by improving
transparency and by pursuing a long-term, national infrastructure development plan.
Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka
3 | Chatham House
1. Introduction
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the largest transcontinental infrastructure scheme in
the history of economic development – is having profound impacts on recipient countries. There is
growing media and policy interest in the experience of Sri Lanka because of its strategic geographical
location along East–West sea lanes, India’s security concerns regarding Chinese military presence in
the Hambantota port, and claims that Sri Lanka has fallen into a Chinese ‘debt trap’ due to commercial
financing of BRI projects. Yet there is an absence of research based on local primary sources
of information.
To fill this research gap, Chatham House commissioned a study of Chinese outbound investment
and the BRI in Sri Lanka. The study, which is the basis for this paper, focused on several issues
concerning Chinese infrastructure investment in 2006–19 including economic aspects and implications
for labour, the environment and institutions. This paper examines the broad benefits and costs of the
BRI and its projects to Sri Lanka and the lessons that may improve future BRI projects in Sri Lanka
and elsewhere. It adopts an evidence-based approach, carefully reviewing the available data and
perceptions of stakeholders, to discern salient facts and trends from popular misconceptions. A novel
feature of the study was the extensive collection of original information through field visits to project
sites and interviews with a range of stakeholders in Sri Lanka.
The study reports that the cumulative value of Chinese infrastructure investment to Sri Lanka
amounted to $12.1 billion between 2006 and July 2019. The crucial development challenge for
Sri Lanka is how best to maximize the benefits from Chinese infrastructure investments while
minimizing any potential costs to ensure net benefits across the project portfolio. Meanwhile, China’s
challenge is how to further its reputation as a responsible global economic partner. It has begun to
address this challenge through growing public diplomacy initiatives and nascent regulatory changes.
The Sri Lankan experience of Chinese infrastructure investment offers useful lessons for other
developing country recipients of Chinese investment. But as countries differ in their institutional and
policy conditions, insights from the Sri Lankan experience are also valuable to individual national
circumstances elsewhere in the developing world.
Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka
4 | Chatham House
2. Economy
China’s first infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka took place in the 1970s in the form of
outright grants, which included the construction of a convention centre.
1
In the early 2000s,
grant-based relations were upgraded to a commercial model that utilized interest-bearing loans and
infrastructure-related foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, the administration of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005–15) initiated important transport, energy and telecommunications projects
with Chinese support – including the coal-fired Norocholai power station in 2006, the Hambantota
port in 2007, the Mattala International Airport in 2010, the Colombo International Container Terminal
(CICT) at the Colombo port in 2011, and the Lotus Tower in 2012 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Value of Chinese development finance to Sri Lanka ($ million)
Source: Calculations based on data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Department of External Resources, Ministry of Finance,
Sri Lanka; Board of Investments, Sri Lanka, and various interviews with key persons.
Note: The chart shows committed funds only up to July 2019.
China announced the BRI in 2013. In Sri Lanka, projects that could conceivably come under the
BRI umbrella began with the Colombo Port City development (located near the Colombo port, but
otherwise unrelated to it) in 2014, which was followed by several road and expressway projects, water
and sanitation projects, and further investments in existing projects such as the revised Hambantota
port deal in 2017.
1
For instance, the iconic Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH), inaugurated in Colombo in 1973, was a Chinese gift
to Sri Lanka emulating the design of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The two countries had enjoyed a warm relationship since Sri Lanka
recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950 and supported China’s accession to the UN. These developments and the
historic barter trade deal – the Ceylon–PRC Rubber-Rice Pact of 1952 – led to China gifting the BMICH to Sri Lanka. See Asirwathan, G. (2018),
‘China-Sri Lanka Relations in the 20th Century’, LKI The Prospector blog, 24 December 2018, https://www.lki.lk/blog/overview-of-sri-lanka-
china-relations/ (accessed 3 Feb. 2020); Wignaraja, G. (2019), Grappling with Great Power Rivalries: Reflections on Sri Lanka’s Engagement
with the United States and China, Working Paper, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, https://www.lki.lk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
BCAS_2019_Dr_Ganeshan_Wignaraja_Sri_Lanka.pdf (accessed 3 Feb. 2020).
2006 2007 2008 20102009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
13,000
11,000
12,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
Cumulative value (pre-BRI period)
Norocholai
power station
Hambantota
port
Mattala
International
Airport
CICT –
Colombo port
Lotus
Tower
Port City
Colombo
Southern
Expressway
Katana Water
Supply Project
455
12,130
Cumulative value (post-BRI period)