IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 14, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2019 2887
Entropy Estimation for ADC Sampling-Based
True Random Number Generators
Yuan Ma, Tiany u Ch en , Jingqiang Lin, Member, IEEE,JingYang , and Jiwu Jing, Member, IEEE
Abstract—True random number generators (TRNGs) are
widely used in cryptographic systems, and their security is the
base of many cryptographic algorithms and protocols. At present,
entropy estimation based on a stochastic model is a well-
recommended approach to evaluate the security of a specific
TRNG structure. Besides, the generation speed is also an impor-
tant property for TRNGs. For this purpose, an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC) can be employed to sample the noisy signal to
achieve high bit rate. However, no research focuses on the entropy
estimation on the basis of the stochastic model toward ADC
sampling. In this paper, we propose an entropy estimation for
the ADC sampling-based TRNG through extending an existing
model. In particular, we present an equivalent model to estimate
the entropy of any single bit in the converted sample obtained
by the ADC sampling. Furthermore, we propose a method of the
entropy estimation for the multi-bit ADC output, which provides
the lower bound of the entropy. By conducting simulations
and hardware experiments on this type of TRNG, we confirm
the correctness of the proposed entropy estimation theory. The
prototype chip is fabricated in the SMIC 65-nm process, and the
consumed power is 34 mW. The random bit sequences compatible
with the AIS 31 standard are generated at a speed of 132.3 Mb/s.
The sequences are able to pass the rigorous statistical test suites,
including NIST SP 800-22, Diehard, and TestU01 (containing the
Big Crush test), after simple post-processing at a bit rate of
around 33 Mb/s.
Index Terms—True random number generator, analog-to-
digital converter sampling, multi-bit entropy estimation, sufficient
entropy, chip implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
R
ANDOM number generator (RNG) represents a basic
cryptographic primitive, and its output named random
number is widely employed in cryptographic systems. The
security of RNGs is the foundation of many cryptographic
algorithms and protocols. Generally speaking, RNGs are clas-
sified into two types: nondeterministic (true-) random number
generators (TRNGs) and deterministic (pseudo-) random num-
ber generators (PRNGs). PRNGs utilize stretching functions
Manuscript received October 7, 2018; revised February 16, 2019 and
March 18, 2019; accepted March 21, 2019. Date of publication April 1,
2019; date of current version June 27, 2019. This work was supported in
part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under
Grant 2016YFB0800102, in part by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China under Grant 61872357, Grant 61802396, Grant 61602476, and
Grant 61772518, and in part by the National Cryptography Development
Fund of China under Grant MMJJ20170205 and Grant MMJJ20180113. The
associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving
it for publication was Dr. Eduard A. Jorswieck. (Corresponding author:
Tianyu Chen.)
The authors are with the Data Assurance and Communication Security
Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China,
and also with the State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute
of Information Engineering, Beijing 100093, China (e-mail: yma@is.ac.cn;
tychen@is.ac.cn; linjq@is.ac.cn; yangjing@is.ac.cn; jing@is.ac.cn).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2908798
to extend a seed (produced by TRNGs) into an arbitrarily
long sequence, and TRNGs collect randomness from physical
phenomena, such as temperature, noise or radioactive decay,
to generate an unpredictable sequence. Thus, the security of
TRNGs is crucial.
Entropy is used to serve as the measure of the unpre-
dictability, and is applicable to the quantification of the true
randomness. The standards ISO 18031 [1] and AIS 31 [2]
recommend to use entropy estimation based on stochastic
models to evaluate the quality of TRNGs. A deal of work
provided various models and entropy calculation approaches
for different kinds of TRNGs. Killmann and Schindler [3]
proposed a general model for calculating the entropy of
common TRNG designs with concise structures. For a par-
ticular design, the model of an elementary oscillator-based
TRNG (EO-TRNG) was investigated through the evolution of
phase [4], [5] and time [6]–[9]. The models for other kinds
of TRNGs were presented in [10]–[12]. The sufficiency of
the entropy provided by TRNGs is crucial for the security
of cryptographic systems that use random numbers.
In addition to the security (i.e., sufficiency of contained
entropy), the generation speed (i.e., bit rate) of random num-
bers is another important factor in TRNG design. Although
EO-TRNGs have been well studied in respect of entropy
estimation, the available jitter amount and the utilization rate
of jitter are very low, which yields a low speed as the
price of achieving high security. Hence, recent solutions pre-
sented in literature focused either on improving the oscillator
structure [11], [13], [14] or on increasing the probability of
collecting jitter [10], [15].
The basic structure of EO-TRNG contains an entropy source
and a sampling unit. In the TRNG, an unstable oscillator gen-
erates a fast sampled signal with jitter, and another oscillator
generates a sampling clock signal with or without jitter. The
randomness comes from jitter in the fast signal that is caused
by noises. For the sake of security, the sampling interval (the
period of the sampling signal) needs to meet the requirement
that, the standard variance of the accumulated jitter within the
interval should be larger than half or even one period of the
sampled signal [4], [8]. So the essential problem is the low
sensitivity of the sampling method to jitter in the EO-TRNGs.
The rough sampling circuit (such as D flip-flop) cannot track
the phase evolution until the accumulated randomness causes
a transition of the voltage.
For this reason, analog-to-digital converter (ADC), a com-
mon device in signal processing circuits, can be employed
to sample the noisy signal for improving the speed. Either
timing jitter or phase noise causes the variation of the voltage
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