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Powering Change. Italian and EU Energy Transition in Times of War
© 2022 IAIIAI PAPERS 22 | 23 - SEPTEMBER 2022
ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-262-6
the country with the German and French networks that transport gas from
Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom through Switzerland
(2.2 bcm in 2021; potential capacity of 12 bcm). In addition, Italy has three LNG
regasification terminals, one onshore (Panigaglia) and two oshore (Adriatic LNG
in Porto Levante and OLT oshore LNG Livorno), which supplied 9.8 bcm in 2021
and have a potential capacity of 16 bcm.
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However, increasing supply from each of
these options to replace Russian gas entails challenges. Examples include growing
domestic demand and low investment levels in Algeria, political instability in Libya
and the tight global LNG market, where major exporters such as Qatar have limited
spare capacity and exports are already booked through long-term contracts.
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In March 2022, the Italian Minister for Energy Transition, Roberto Cingolani,
outlined all the short-term and long-term options that could allow Italy to cut
its energy dependence on Russia. He announced that, following the outbreak
of the conflict, there have been diplomatic missions to producing countries,
including Qatar, Algeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and that
these sources could collectively provide 20 bcm per year through short-term and
medium-term solutions. Other markets have also been considered to increase LNG
supply, including Mozambique, Nigeria and Egypt, where gas is mostly managed
by Italy’s energy giant Eni, as well as the United States.
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Cingolani also announced
that national production of gas from existing extraction sites would be increased
by 2.2 bcm to alleviate the burden of increasing costs on national enterprises
(current national production is around 4 bcm).
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One of the short-term options is rapidly increasing the TAP’s capacity by 1.5 bcm,
yet this is conditional on increased production in Azerbaijan. Another possibility is
maximising the use of existing LNG terminals, which would provide an additional
6 bcm per year. Finally, in case of emergency, the possibility of increasing power
production from existing coal power stations (expected to be phased out in 2025)
could be considered. In June 2022, the Italian Comitato tecnico di emergenza e
monitoraggio del sistema gas naturale, an emergency technical committee tasked
with monitoring the gas system, approved the purchase of coal in preparation for
the potential implementation of this plan in light of the Russian coal embargo that
has been adopted by the EU and entered into force in August 2022.
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Italian Senate, “Informativa del Ministro della transizione ecologica sui recenti ulteriori rincari del
costo dell’energia e sulle misure del Governo per contrastarne gli eetti e conseguente discussione”,
in Resoconto stenografico 414a seduta, 16 March 2022, p. 7, https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/
PDFServer/BGT/1343136.pdf.
4
Margherita Bianchi and Pier Paolo Raimondi, “Russian Energy Exports and the Conflict in Ukraine:
What Options for Italy and the EU?”, in IAI Commentaries, No. 22|13 (March 2022), https://www.iai.
it/en/node/14859.
5
Italian Parliament-Joint Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR), Relazione sulle
conseguenze del conflitto tra Russia e Ucraina nell’ambito della sicurezza energetica, 27 April 2022,
p. 4-6, https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1348494.pdf.
6
Italian Senate, “Informativa del Ministro della transizione ecologica…”, cit., p. 13; Italian Parliament-
COPASIR, Relazione sulle conseguenze del conflitto tra Russia e Ucraina…, cit., p. 4.
7
“Gas, MITE: non necessario livello di allerta. Via ad acquisti carbone”, in La Stampa, 21 June 2022,
