Barclays | U.S. Autos & Auto Parts
5 September 2019 5
• Lack of liquid market for asset disposals
• Lack of active sponsor market for exits
• High capex and working capital requirements
• Concerns over terminal value in powertrain exposed business
Mixed – but better than perceived – results from late cycle deals from mid-
2000s
At this point, autos are ~10 years into a rising/plateaued SAAR environment – much as they
were in ~2005 (14 years of SAAR growth/plateau). With auto parts (and OEMS) cheap at
that time, and LBO firms searching for new opportunities, a few high-profile auto deals were
struck that are perceived (perhaps unfairly) by public market investors as either not
successful at worst, or at best, ones in which sponsors had to wait years for an exit. These
included
• Cerberus’s purchase of Chrysler stands out in most of our conversations with investors
as ‘proof’ that late cycle LBOs are unlikely to be successful. Cerberus purchased
Chrysler in 2007 for a total of $7.4bn, with $1.35bn paid to Daimler, $5bn for
improvements to the automotive unit and $1bn for the finance arm. Cerberus
reportedly did not take on debt to fund the transaction
1
Cerberus lost its stake in the
automotive company in the 2009 bankruptcy.
2
However, it retained ownership of
Chrysler Financial, which it sold to TD Bank in 2010 for $6.3bn for the loan book, while
retaining auto insurance and other units worth ~$940mn, leaving it close to whole on
the overall Chrysler investment
3
.
• Tower International – Cerberus purchased Tower International, a maker of light truck
frames and body parts out of bankruptcy in 2007 for a total of $1bn
4
, of which $213mn
was equity
5
. Tower returned to the public markets in 2010, and Cerberus began exiting
its position in 2013 for proceeds of at least $300mn. While the return on the initial
equity might have been unappealing, Cerberus owned $403.9mn of Tower first-lien debt
as of Dec. 31, 2009,
6
which was refinanced at par in 2011. If Cerberus had bought the
debt during the financial crisis at a discount (say 50% of face) the debt transactions
could add $200mn to the recovery. In addition, Tower paid Cerberus $68mn in Dec
2007 after the sale of its interest in Metalsa, and paid $14mn of distributions between
2007 and 10. We estimate about 15% IRR on the equity component (with the quick sale
of Metalsa helping) and ~23%% in total, assuming the distressed first tier debt was
trading at 50c on the dollar as Cerberus acquired its stake.
• Dana – Centerbridge provided $250mn of exit financing (for Class A preferred shares)
for Dana as it left bankruptcy in 2007, and began to execute a turnaround plan focused
on driving manufacturing efficiencies. However, the 2008 recession pressured the
shares, and Centerbridge exited its position in 2013 when Dana repurchased the Class A
shares for $472mn. With the 4% dividend yield on the preferred shares, the six-year IRR
appears to have been ~14%.
1
https://www.reuters.com/article/chrysler-cerberus-deal/cerberus-deal-for-chrysler-not-your-average-lbo-
idUSN1432413220070514
2
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09cerb.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=692A0C7B9E2FDDB
717A83ECEA1BA07B2&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL
3
See https://fortune.com/2010/12/21/cerberus-saying-goodbye-to-chrysler-financial/ and
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/cerberus-recouping-costs-will-sell-chrysler-
financial/?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=FD0ACDB4ACAB6A7391D8E1161CDB80D8&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWA
LL
4
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-towerautomotive-cerberus-idUSWNAS572620070711
5
https://www.autonews.com/article/20101014/OEM10/101019911/cerberus-s-tower-international-sets-ipo-price-
at-13-a-share
6
Tower S-1 filed at https://investors.towerinternational.com/static-files/fc13649b-6f82-43c3-913b-638e16ac5bdc
评论0
最新资源