More and more computing devices are coming into existence every day, which may vary in size,
capabilities, mode of interaction, and so on. As a result we are moving toward a world in which
computing is omnipresent. Many modern devices (e.g., smart printers, PDAs, smart phones, and
cameras) support multiple communication channels and almost all of them use wireless technology
in some form, such as Bluetooth, Infrared, Wibree, Zigbee, 802.11, IrDA, or ultrasound. Having
wireless technology in these devices does not guarantee that all of these devices can also take
advantage of Internet technology. However, those wireless-enabled devices that cannot connect
to Internet can still take advantage of other colocated devices in the vicinity by forming shortterm
or long-term associations on ad hoc basis: for example, pairing a Bluetooth-enabled headset
with a mobile phone or an MP3 player (short term) and pairing of a PDA with home devices
in order to control them wirelessly (long term). Some other examples of pairing from everyday
life include pairing of a Bluetooth keyboard with a Desktop computer, pairing of a laptop with
an access point or a printer through the use of a WiFi or Bluetooth, and pairing of two mobile
phones to exchange the music files or other data. Since wireless communication is susceptible to
eavesdropping, thus one can easily launch man-in-the-middle (MiTM), denial-of-service (DoS), or
bidding-down attacks to break the secure pairing process. Therefore, the main goal of secure pairing
research is to provide assurance of the identity of the devices participating in the pairing process
and to secure them from being victims of eavesdropping attacks, such as MiTM attack. Achieving
this goal is a challenging problem from both the security and the usability or user interaction points
of view
