Relationships with other Formalisms 145
Later
[
Levesque and Brachman, 1987
]
, Kl-One
was provided with a well-defined
“Tarski-style” semantics which fixed the precise meaning of its graphical constructs
and led to the definition of the first Description Logic
[
Levesque and Brachman,
1987
]
, at that time also called terminological languages, concept languages, or Kl-
One
based languages. Besides giving a precise meaning to semantic networks, this
formalisation allowed the investigation of inference algorithms with respect to their
soundness, completeness, and computational complexity. For example, it turned
out that subsumption in Kl-One is undecidable, mainly due to role-value-maps
[
Schmidt-Schauß, 1989
]
.
4.1.2 Frame systems
Minsky
[
1981
]
introduced frame systems as an alternative to logic-oriented ap-
proaches to knowledge representation, which he thought were not adequate to “sim-
ulate common sense thinking” for various reasons. His system provides record-like
data structures to represent prototypical knowledge concerning situations and ob-
jects and includes defaults, multiple perspectives, and analogies. Nowadays, se-
mantic networks and frame systems are often viewed as the same family of for-
malisms. However, in standard semantic networks, properties are restricted to
primitive, atomic ones, whereas, in general, properties in frame systems can be
complex concepts described by frames.
One goal of the frame approach was to gather all relevant knowledge about a situa-
tion (e.g., entering a restaurant) in one object instead of distributing this knowledge
across various axioms. Roughly spoken, a situation (or an object) is described in one
frame. Similar to entries in a record, a frame contains
slots to represent properties
of the situation described by the frame. Reasoning comes in two shapes: (1) Using
a “partial matching”, more specific frames are embedded into more general ones,
thus giving, for example, meaning to a new situation or classifying an object as a
kind of, say, bird. (2) Searching for slot fillers to collect more information con-
cerning a specific situation. A variety of expert systems
[
Fikes and Kehler, 1985;
Christaller et al., 1992; Gen, 1995; Flex, 1999
]
are based on a frame-based formalism
and are further enhanced with rules, triggers, daemons, etc.
Despite the fact that frame systems were designed as an alternative to logic, the
monotonic, declarative part of this formalism could be shown to be captured us-
ing first-order predicate logic
[
Hayes, 1977; 1979
]
. To our knowledge, no precise
semantics could be given for the non-declarative, non-logic, or non-monotonic as-
pects of frame systems. Hence neither their expressive power nor the quality of
the corresponding reasoning algorithms and services can be compared with other
formalisms.
In the remainder of this section, we show how the monotonic part of a frame-