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中国在欧洲投资基础设施的安全影响.pdf
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Report
The Security Implications
of Chinese Infrastructure
Investment in Europe
September 2021
Report
2
Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : e Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 Summary
5 Introduction
Andrew Small
8 Germany and its Neighbors
Mareike Ohlberg
22 Italy and the Mediterranean
Dario Cristiani
35 The Nordic Countries
Jonas Parello-Plesner
45 Conclusion
September 2021
Report
3
Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : e Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe
SUMMARY
Even before the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provided additional clarity about China’s strategic intent,
Europe had experienced major influxes of Chinese finance, used to snap up everything from fading brands
to large-scale infrastructure assets. The EU and many European states have already expedited their plans to
strengthen or launch investment-screening processes.
Yet Europe is still in the early stages of determining the right balance of security, openness, and economic
resilience when it comes to China’s economic presence. Many investment-screening mechanisms are new or
untested. Debates over how far strategic infrastructure should be viewed through a military security prism
continue apace in NATO. China’s “dual circulation” plans for its domestic economy, which signal a more
radical approach to self-sufficiency for itself and dependency for others, are still in their embryonic phase, as
is European thinking about how to adjust policy in light of it.
Through the analysis of three emblematic case studies, this report takes stock of the situation and highlights
commonalities in Beijing’s approach to infrastructure investment in Europe.
The first case is Germany and its neighbors. Germany remains the economic locus for much of the wider
region, and is the dominant actor for the European economy as a whole, which gives outsized weight to
national and sub-national choices in the country about how to deal with Chinese economic actors. While
specific industrial sectors continue to deepen their commercial ties, concern from important sections of
industry about the systemic impact of Chinese economic and political practices has arguably had the single
greatest impact on the changing nature of the European debate on China.
The second case is Italy and the wider Mediterranean region. Southern Europe was the locus of the biggest
wave of Chinese investments in sensitive sectors during the eurozone crisis. Many saw Italy’s willingness to
sign up to the BRI in 2019 as simply a repeat of the Greek and Portuguese experience earlier. Yet, the picture
has proved vastly more complex. Membership of BRI, far from resulting in a deepening of Sino-Italian rela-
tions saw a diplomatic backlash produced by the BRI memorandum of understanding and the end of the
populist coalition government, formed by the Five Star Movement and the League, that signed it.
The third chapter moves to the Nordic countries. The crux of the recent story there too is the change in
approach from some of Europe’s most open and technologically advanced states, which have shifted from
seeing China through the prism of globalization’s benefits to revisiting the permeability of their systems in
light of the risks that it poses.
September 2021
Report
4
Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : e Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe
The coming phase of Chinese infrastructure investment in Europe will not resemble the previous ones.
Beijing is well aware of the changed political climate in many countries, of the heightened sensitivities around
these investments, of the greater attention from the United States, and of the new scrutiny mechanisms that
are in place.
Nonetheless, European analysis and responses to China has often been characterized by a “rearview mirror”
approach. In drawing lessons from the case studies, the main question to address is how to ensure that the
substance of the security concerns relating to Chinese investment is addressed rather than just the specific
forms it has taken in the past.
This includes:
• building appropriate expertise to ensure that governments are better attuned to China’s changing goals
and methods;
• addressing the more complex set of dependencies that China is now looking to establish with Europe
through the “dual circulation” agenda;
• better integrating investment screening with the trade and industrial policy agenda, including with close
attention to the European and allied military industrial base, with digital infrastructure as a central priority;
• adjusting legal frameworks rapidly, and retaining sufficiently expansive discretionary powers to be able to
deter actions that work against the spirit of the screening legislation or move retroactively when this fails;
• robust transparency requirements relating to ownership, control, finances, audits, and personnel;
• a more active role for NATO and defense ministries in identifying risks and raising red flags that are
shared with other alliance members;
• pushing ahead with a more serious infrastructure finance offer from Europe and its partners to third
countries, lining up connectivity finance and streamlining the fragmented, slow-moving processes that
add up to less than the sum of their parts; and
• ensuring that European states have sufficient capacity to influence the overall shape of the emerging
framework of essential coordination among like-minded partners, rather than being primarily reactive to
developments in U.S. and Chinese policy.
September 2021
Report
5
Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : e Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe
INTRODUCTION
In many ways, Europeans are seasoned hands in navigating Chinese investments. Even before the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) provided additional clarity about China’s strategic intent, the continent had experienced
major influxes of Chinese finance used to snap up everything from fading brands to large-scale infrastruc-
ture assets. The experience of the coronavirus pandemic has helped to sharpen minds further. Learning their
lessons from the preceding years, and from the eurozone crisis in particular, the EU and many European states
expedited their plans to strengthen or launch screening processes to prevent Chinese investors from acquiring
valuable assets at fire-sale prices.
In other respects, though, Europe is still in the early stages of determining the right balance of security, open-
ness, and economic resilience when it comes to China’s economic presence. Many investment-screening
mechanisms are new or untested. Debates over how far strategic infrastructure should be viewed through a
military security prism continue apace in NATO. China’s “dual circulation” plans for its domestic economy,
which signal a more radical approach to Chinese self-sufficiency and dependency for others, are still in their
embryonic phase, as is European thinking about how to adjust policy in light of it. The recently concluded
EU-China investment agreement has proved highly contentious and its ratification is in doubt.
Europe is still in the early stages of determining the right balance of security, openness,
and economic resilience when it comes to China’s economic presence.
This report, which has benefited from funding support from the Ministry of Defense of Norway, provides a
stock-take. The overall landscape for infrastructure investments in Europe during and beyond the pandemic
is conditioned by developments on the ground and the rapidly shifting political context in several European
states. The three major case studies in the report illuminate the current state of play in each regard.
The first case is Germany and its neighbors. While so much of the scrutiny of BRI investments in recent
years has been concentrated on Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, it is Chinese investment patterns in
Germany that have been the hinge for much of the recent pan-European decision-making. Germany also
remains the economic locus for much of the wider region and the European economy as a whole, giving
outsized weight to national and, as the chapter explains, sub-national choices in the country about how to deal
with Chinese economic actors. In its original conception, Germany represented the literal endpoint for the
Belt and Road, the economic counterpoint to China at the far end of the Eurasian landmass. While specific
industrial sectors continue to deepen their commercial ties, and act as the strongest ballast for a cooperative
Sino-European relationship, anxiety has grown. Concern from important sections of German industry about
the systemic impact of Chinese economic and political practices has arguably had the single greatest impact
on the changing nature of the European debate on China.
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