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【世界银行】新兴和发展中经济体的资本管制与美国货币政策的传导(英).pdf
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【世界银行】新兴和发展中经济体的资本管制与美国货币政策的传导(英).pdf
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P R W P
10582
Capital Controls in Emerging and Developing
Economies and the Transmission of U.S.
Monetary Policy
Jongrim Ha
Haiqin Liu
John Rogers
Development Economics
Prospects Group
October 2023
Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure Authorized
Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
e Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the ndings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the ndings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. e papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. e ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. ey do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its aliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
P R W P 10582
Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)
exhibit signicantly greater volatility in asset returns than
advanced economies. e commonalities in these returns
(and ows) across countries are particularly strong for
EMDEs. If these occur independently of the exchange
rate regime and if these global nancial cycle eects are
furthermore independent of countries’ nancial openness,
the result is Obstfeld (2022)’s “Lemma”: countries can do
nothing to decouple from the global nancial cycle. Under
the prevalent view that U.S. monetary policy is the key
driver of the global nancial cycle, countries then inherit
U.S. monetary policy no matter what they do on exchange
rates or capital control policies. Using structural vector
autoregression models for 78 countries over 1995–2019,
as well as dierent methods of identifying U.S. monetary
policy shocks from the literature, this paper tests the propo-
sition that countries with less open capital accounts exhibit
systematically smaller responses to U.S. monetary policy
shocks than low capital control countries. is paper also
considers the role of other institutional features such as
exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange interventions
in explaining cross-country dierences in the responses to
the shocks. e empirical results suggest that more stringent
capital controls exhibit smaller responses of interest rates
and exchange rates to U.S. monetary policy shocks and that
this result holds more rmly for EMDEs than advanced
economies. In contrast, the analysis nds only weak evi-
dence that the degree of exchange rate exibility aects
U.S. spillovers to foreign interest rates and exchange rates.
is paper is a product of the Prospects Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger eort by the World Bank to
provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. e authors may be contacted
at jongrimha@worldbank.org.
Capital Controls in Emerging and Developing Economies and
the Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy
Jongrim Ha
World Bank
jongrimha@worldbank.org
Haiqin Liu
Fudan University
liuhq21@m.fudan.edu.cn
John Rogers
Fudan University
johnrogers@fudan.edu.cn
∗
Keywords: Federal Reserve; Spillovers; Capital Flow Management
JEL codes: E44, E52, F38
∗
We thank Carlos Arteta, Steve Kamin, Michael Klein, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, Hayley Pallan,
Franz Ulrich Ruch, and many other participants in the World Bank seminars for useful comments. The findings,
interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the
World Bank, Fudan University, or the institutions the authors are affiliated with.
1 Introduction
The current period of unprecedented monetary policy tightening in the U.S. and other advanced
economies has given rise to renewed urgency to understanding the extent of international monetary
policy spillovers as well as ascertaining the policy options that may be on the table for countries
to mitigate potentially harmful effects from these spillovers. According to the classic Trilemma,
countries can choose only two of: free international capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate, and
sovereign monetary policy. Capital controls allow monetary policy to be set independently of foreign
monetary policies while also being used to limit volatility in the exchange rate. Floating exchange
rates allow a country to have open international capital markets while its central bank sets monetary
policy independently of foreign monetary policies if it so chooses.
1
The literature on spillovers and the Trilemma was given significant impetus by work on
the Global Financial Cycle (GFC). Rey (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino & Rey (2020) document
persuasive evidence that significant commonalities exist between the movements of credit aggregates,
credit flows, and asset prices across countries, correlations that are particularly high during crises.
Emerging-market economies are particularly subject to the GFC (Kalemli-Özcan 2019). It has been
argued that U.S. monetary policy is the key driver of the global financial cycle, a proposition that
has key implications for understanding what policy options may or may not be “on the table”.
2
In his
discussion of Miranda-Agrippino & Rey (2020), Obstfeld (2022) cleverly enunciated the implications
of this literature: “If being relatively more closed financially does not insulate one from the Global
Financial Cycle, then perhaps we have:
– not Trilemma
– not even Dilemma
– but instead:
Lemma. No matter what policies countries follow, they cannot decouple from the Global Financial
Cycle.”
In this paper, we estimate the spillover effects of identified U.S. monetary policy shocks to
1
Note that the Trilemma does not posit that with floating exchange rates, a country’s domestic financial markets
and asset prices are fully insulated from foreign monetary policies and financial developments. Even with a floating
exchange rate and independently-set policy interest rates, a country’s stock prices, longer-term bond yields, and other
asset values will be influenced by global developments, and the Trilemma does not contradict that.
2
When the Fed eases, the reasoning goes, global intermediaries and other investors are reassured about the
economic outlook. Consequently, volatility falls and risk appetite increases, leading in turn to higher leverage and
rapid expansion of credit. When the Fed tightens, the process is reversed. See Miranda-Agrippino & Rey (forthcoming)
for an exhaustive review of the literature on the GFC.
1
foreign interest rates and exchange rates in a panel of up to 78 countries. Aligning those spillover
effects with measures of capital control stringency, we examine if countries with less open capital
accounts exhibit systematically smaller responses. We also consider the role of other country factors
such as the exchange rate regime, economic region and foreign exchange intervention in explaining
cross-country differences in responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
We find some evidence that countries with more stringent capital controls exhibit smaller
responses of interest rates and exchange rates to U.S. monetary policy shocks. This result is more
evident for samples of emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) and advanced economies
(AEs) viewed separately. In contrast, we find only weak evidence that the degree of exchange rate
regime flexibility affects U.S. spillovers to foreign interest rates and exchange rates. Our findings
indicate that (i) the global financial system lies between the classic Trilemma and Obstfeld’s “Lemma”,
and (ii) policy tools like capital controls are still powerful under this backdrop, for EMDEs in
particular.
Related Literature A vast academic literature since the late 1990s examined a wide range of
experiences with capital controls without consensus on their “effectiveness”. Rodrik (1998) found no
evidence of a positive correlation between capital account openness and growth or investment/GDP
ratios, and argued against capital account convertibility. Edwards (2001) reached the opposite
conclusion, using a different measure of capital controls, as did in Grilli & Milesi-Ferretti (1995).
Edison et al. (2004) considered a host of international financial openness measures and were unable
to find robust evidence that openness accelerates economic growth. Still, Chinn & Ito (2002) found
that financial development, measured by private credit creation and stock market capitalization, was
negatively correlated with the extent of capital controls, a correlation that was stronger in developed
countries with solid institutional frameworks. Dooley (1996), Eichengreen (2002), and Edison et al.
(2004) surveyed this earlier literature. Building on this to shed light on the effectiveness of capital
controls, Miniane & Rogers (2007) tested the proposition that countries with more stringent capital
controls experienced smaller financial market spillovers from U.S. monetary policy shocks. They
found no evidence to support this notion of capital control effectiveness.
More recently, Georgiadis (2016) assesses spillovers from identified U.S. monetary policy shocks
in a global VAR (GVAR) model. He finds that U.S. monetary policy generates sizable output spillovers
to the rest of the world, the magnitude of which depends on the receiving country’s trade and financial
integration, financial openness, exchange rate regime, financial market development, labor market
rigidities, industry structure, and participation in global value chains. Ahmed et al. (2021) find that
2
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