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汇丰银行-全球-宏观策略-美国贸易政策:关税评估-44-26页.pdf
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汇丰银行-全球-宏观策略-美国贸易政策:关税评估-44-26页.pdf
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Disclosures & Disclaimer
This report must be read with the disclosures and the analyst certifications in
the Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it.
Issuer of report: HSBC Bank plc
View HSBC Global Research at:
https://www.research.hsbc.com
The US trade policy targets rivals, friends, and WTO, seeking
to remedy unfair practices and gain leverage in talks
US remains a relatively open economy (as are its DM partners),
and the direct cost of the new tariffs so far is marginal, but rising
We address the key issues through a series of questions,
including the impacts on the US economy and businesses
Bold, risky gambit: Last year saw President Trump deliver on many of his 2016
campaign promises with respect to trade. In 2018, the US implemented five rounds of
punitive tariffs covering USD304bn of imports (12.6% of total US 2017 imports), mainly
on imports from China and on products such as steel and aluminium. Some 14.9% of
US imports are covered by special tariffs if existing punitive tariffs are also considered
(PIIE, 2019). In some cases, the US used unconventional means (ie, national security
provisions) to enact these tariffs. US partners have sought talks, litigated, and retaliated.
The US tariff actions were preceded by the president’s 2017 decision to withdraw from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a deep and comprehensive trade deal covering much of
the Pacific Basin, though not China.
Mixed results: The US may have gained leverage in some cases from its tariff actions
(eg, in renegotiating the US-Korea bilateral accord). In other instances, the US has
incurred costs. One estimate found the US tariffs have led to efficiency losses of
USD1.4bn a month, added 1.1ppt to US domestic prices in manufacturing and
redirected some USD165bn in US trade on annual basis.
1
And while there is bipartisan
support in the US for challenging China’s “unfair” trade practices (eg, alleged abuse of
intellectual property rights), these unilateral actions have come at a cost to US soft
power. The US has foregone alliances with like-minded partners for reform at the WTO,
enforcement of WTO trade rules’ and plurilateral liberalisation in areas like services. It
has increased trade policy uncertainty.
Risks and opportunities: Aggressive interpretation of global trade rules could
encourage other economies to push boundaries as well (eg, use of national security
arguments to protect domestic industries). And ongoing tariff actions are expected to
hurt US states most reliant on these imports, such as those in Midwest and Northeast for
steel and aluminium, along with those affected by retaliatory tariffs. Uncertainty is also
likely to weigh on business activity, lessen prospects for trade liberalisation and detract
from US competitiveness. At the same time, there could be opportunities for US
businesses to replace tariffed imports with domestic products (eg, steel), or benefit from
price reductions where foreign retaliation hits US exports (eg, soybeans). New US trade
deals (eg, US-Korea, USMCA or the proposed US-Japan and US-EU deals) could also
provide some new market access opportunities.
1
M. Amiti, S. Redding, E. Weinstein, “Impact of the 2018 trade war”, CEPR, March 2019, DP 13564.
4 April 2019
Doug Lippoldt
Chief Trade Economist
HSBC Bank plc
douglas.lippoldt@hsbc.com
+44 20 7992 0375
Shanella Rajanayagam
Trade Economist
HSBC Bank plc
shanella.l.rajanayagam@hsbc.com
+44 20 3268 4118
US trade policy
Economics
Global
Taking stock of the tariffs
Economics
● Global
4 April 2019
2
Intro
This paper takes stock of highlights from the changes in US trade policy during the Trump
Administration, considering the costs, risks and areas where gains for business might be found.
The assessment builds on a long series of trade reports prepared by HSBC Global Research
economists over the past year.
2
We start with a survey of the costs of recent US trade policy
actions to the US economy (p. 2), then turn to consider actions intended to resolve the US
challenges (p. 8), and finally move to consider risks and opportunities (p. 13). A short conclusion
looks ahead considering the continued importance of the multilateral trading system and market
openness of the US economy (p. 15). The analysis is anchored by a series of 11 questions that
run throughout the main paper. Annexes provide a review of the main trade measures
employed by the US Administration during 2018 (p. 16), a detailed state-level assessment of the
aluminium and steel tariffs imposed by the US in 2018 (p. 18), and a comparison of average
tariffs among leading trading nations (p. 22).
Contemplating the costs
What is the starting point for the US policy change?
The longstanding US support for trade liberalisation and development of the multilateral trading
system in the post-WWII period is in line with mainstream economic thinking on the benefits of
markets openness. In striving for gains from trade and market openness, the US has also been
prone to usage of exceptions and trade remedies to assuage lingering trade concerns. From the
constraints on textiles and apparel trade under the now-defunct "Multi-Fiber Arrangement" (in
effect from 1974 to 1994) to the continued usage of anti-dumping measures, the US has often
pushed back against domestic trade concerns by conceding some constraints on openness
using sector or product specific measures. However, in the face of growing concerns about
globalisation, the Trump Administration has scaled up these efforts and brought large scale
trade liberalisation to a halt.
While there are legitimate trade grievances to be addressed (as with forced technology transfer
and abuse of intellectual property rights), it appears that there is a net cost to the US economy
2
See HSBC reports: Asian Economics Quarterly: With a boost from China, 28 March 2018; Global Economics Quarterly: Trading
down, 3 January 2019; US-China trade truce, 2 December 2018; US-China trade perspectives, 26 November 2018, US-China
trade, 13 July 2018, US fuels trade tensions, 22 June 2018; US-China trade relations V: The art of non-war, 23 March 2018. The
discussion in the present paper focuses on US policies with respect to trade development and does not cover sanctions matters.
US gets tough on trade
The cost of the change in US trade policy is marginal but rising
US toughness is being channelled through a range of unilateral
measures, bilateral negotiations, and multilateral actions
Opportunities still exist via most traditional trade channels, also niches
where market access is improving or import substitution is feasible
3
Economics
● Global
4 April 2019
from the recent ramping up of US trade remedies. One well-known consideration is that there is
an asymmetry in the costs and benefits of trade liberalisation or protectionism. The firm or sector
benefitting from protectionism can reap significant gains while the benefits from liberalisation may
be more diffuse. As a result, the protectionists may be highly motivated.
In addition, the pro-trade resolve of policy makers in a large country such as the US may be
weakened due to the tendency for trade to play a smaller role in a market where there are more
options to source products domestically (Chart 1). The US economy has the scale to
accommodate a broad range of competitive domestic suppliers. And, in countries such as the
US, Japan, and – increasingly – China, services account for a large share of the domestic
economy. In the case of the US, for example, services accounted for some 77% of value added
as of 2016 (World Bank, WDI data). Many services tend to be much less trade intensive than
goods. Thus, US policy makers may be less sensitive to the cost of protectionism or foregone
liberalisation (eg, pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership) than policy makers in smaller, open
economies. Interestingly, China as well has a relatively low trade intensity in its economy, which
may also give its policy makers a bit more latitude in dealing with the US reorientation in trade
policy than would otherwise be the case.
Chart 1. Trade as a share of GDP, percent, 2017
(Trade = sum of goods and services, imports and exports)
Note: All data are for 2017 except for Japan and United States, which are for 2016. Source: World Bank, National Accounts
Thus, it may come as no surprise that the Trump Administration has been able to draw on
existing US trade law and pursue a much more aggressive policy on trade over the past year.
This has featured in particular the expanded use of tariffs as remedies for alleged trade abuses
or to gain negotiating leverage in negotiations on other matters. The US grievances motivating its
tariff actions range from concerns about intellectual property abuse to economic distortions due
to the state-led interventions (eg, via subsidies), tariff rates applied by trade partners, the
availability of trade preferences to developing countries on the basis of self-declaration, and
limitations on access to agricultural markets, among other issues.
Chinese economic policy has been a particular focus for the Trump Administration, as have – to
a lesser extent – trade policies in Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico. Overall, the
US special tariff actions (new and existing) in effect during 2018 affected nearly 15% of US
26.6
31.3
37.8
41.1
64.1
71.7
77.5
80.8
86.0
118.9
322.4
0.0 50.0 100.0 150.0 200.0 250.0 300.0 350.0
United States
Japan
China
India
Canada
World average
Mexico
Korea, Rep.
European Union
Switzerland
Singapore
Economics
● Global
4 April 2019
4
goods imports, according to an estimate from a team at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics (PIIE).
3
As part of the reorientation of US trade policy during 2018, the US Administration drew on
provisions available under domestic trade law (see Annex 1 for details). The actions have
increased tariffs and in some cases resulted in quantitative restrictions on imports. The main
measures included:
Increased use of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures (AD/CVD);
Recourse to safeguard measures against import surges;
Recourse to protection against unfair trade practices by trade partners (notably China);
National security measures against importation of certain strategically important products.
What are the impacts of the tariffs on the US economy?
This section of the paper reviews some of the recent empirical literature on the economic
implications of the US tariff actions of 2018. The next section considers employment vulnerability.
Among the most comprehensive assessments of the US tariff actions one finds the recent paper
by Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019). These authors consider the economic burden on the US
as a consequence of the US Administration’s tariff strategy as implemented during 2018.
4
Using
regression analysis to assess the relationships among key variables while controlling for other
factors, the authors find detrimental impacts on prices, varieties available, and welfare. Their
assessment provides some unsettling insights:
The additional monthly tariff costs amount to USD3bn and these costs are born
almost exclusively by the US-based firms and consumers dependent on the imports.
In other words, the tariffs appear to be fully passed through (ie, the exporters in China are
not paying the tariffs via decreased margins on their exports). The tariff revenue is a pure
transfer from domestic stakeholders to the US government.
The tariff hike effectively reduced import supply to the US economy. A one percentage
point increase in tariffs was associated with a six point fall in import quantities. Overall, the
affected product categories saw a decline in imports of 54% from the original suppliers,
though some of this was offset by foreign suppliers not affected by the tariffs.
The authors estimate that the overall volume of trade redirected as a result of the
import tariffs in 2018 amounted to USD136bn (now about USD11.4bn monthly). This is
a significant shock to supply chains as businesses scramble to find alternative domestic or
foreign supplies. In addition, about USD2.4bn of monthly US exports are redirected as a
consequence of retaliation.
With the imposition of tariffs, the number of varieties of the affected products
generally declined, by up to 10% on average depending on which wave of tariffs one
considered.
5
In the recent years leading up to the tariff hikes, the numbers of varieties
(defined by the HTS 10 digit tariff line and country code) had been tending to rise.
3
These data are from Chad Bown and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, “Measuring Trump's 2018 Trade Protection: Five Takeaways”, PIIE, 15
February 2019. They refer to trade covered by President Trump’s tariff actions over 2018 as well as existing punitive antidumping
and countervailing duties implemented by prior administrations. The estimate accounts for imports subject to both new and existing
tariff measures to avoid double counting.
4
Mary Amiti, Stephen Redding and David Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare”, CEPR
Discussion Paper 13564, March 2019.
5
The first wave of tariffs on solar cells and large washing machines, however, did not have this effect. This may have been because
of the temporary nature of the tariff and the narrow targeting on a limited number of tariff lines.
5
Economics
● Global
4 April 2019
The estimate of deadweight losses (ie, due to lost efficiency) reached USD1.4bn per
month once the US Administration had implemented the various waves of additional US
tariffs. These losses continue.
Product prices typically rose by 10% to 30% once a tariff was implemented (prices
estimated based on unit values of goods imported). For the products concerned, prices
rose even for supply from countries not targeted. Overall, Amiti et al estimate that US
domestic prices were 1.1% higher in manufacturing industries in 2018 due to the tariffs (the
average annual producer price inflation over the past 20 years was a bit over 2%).
Potential gains from a future US-China trade deal are unlikely to yield a net economic
benefit in the short to medium term, eg, potential improvements in intellectual property
rights protection from a possible US-China deal may boost US royalties, but even a 25%
increase in current royalty payments (total royalties in 2017 amounted to USD8.3bn) would
take three years to offset the losses so far from the US tariff war. If the US tariff war led to
enough job creation to offset the loss of every steel and aluminium job lost over the last 10
years (35,400), then allocating the deadweight tariff loss across all the jobs created would
yield an approximate cost of USD195,000 per job (ie, four times the annual wage of a steel
worker (USD52,500).
Fajgelbaum et al (2019) conducted a further study on the topic using an alternative methodology
based on estimated demand and supply elasticities integrated into a supply-side model of the US
economy. The authors found similar types of impacts to those in Amiti et al (2019).
6
Fajgenbaum
et al (2019) estimate that the trade affected by the US measures included about 12.6% of US
imports (USD 303bn of 2017 exports) and that this trade experienced an average increase in
tariff from 2.6% to 17%. They estimate that 6.2% of US exports (USD 96bn of 2017 imports) were
affected by retaliation and experienced an increase in average tariff from 6.6% to 23%. Imports of
the targeted products and countries declined by about 32% and targeted US exports fell by 11%.
The authors found high pass-through of tariff costs to US and foreign consumers. Overall, when
tariff revenue is factored in, they estimate that the trade war lowered aggregate US welfare by
USD7.8bn on an annualised basis, 0.04% of GDP. Fajgelbaum et al further note that US tariffs
appear targeted to support sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, whereas the
retaliation weighed in particular on Republican-dominated counties.
Broad structural challenges
These trade impediments come on top of on-going challenges faced by traders due to larger
structural changes in the global economy, a point noted recently by Susan Lund (McKinsey).
7
For
example, she notes that wages are becoming less important as a share of production costs, even
as knowledge intensity and skill intensity of work in increasing as automation, research, and
innovation are playing a bigger role in competitiveness. Some reshoring of production in DMs has
followed from this. Intra-regional trade is increasing in importance in Asia, the EU and the US as
speed-to-market is seen to convey competitive advantages. At the same time, EMs are claiming
a bigger share of global economic activity, and producers there are also raising competitive
challenges to incumbents. Thus, it is not surprising that in a survey of global business executives
in the autumn of 2018, McKinsey found that about three-fourths of firms surveyed were changing
their globalisation strategies in light of such developments. In response to trade policy
uncertainty, about a half were shifting the geographic footprint of their supply chains and about a
quarter are building out their domestic production to reduce exposure to trade policy uncertainty.
6
Pablo Fajgelbaum, Pinelopi Goldberg, Patrick Kennedy, and Amit Khandelwal, “The Return to Protectionism”, working paper,
UCLA, 10 March 2019
7
Susan Lund interviewed on Trade Talks, Episode 69, “Slowbalization”, by Soumaya Keynes and Chad Bown, PIIE, 25 January
2019.
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