d recognized information. Accounting reports that have been manipulated mislead the market, causing resources to flow into enterprises that should not receive them while starving those that truly need them. This misdirection of resources exacerbates inefficiencies in the market and can lead to economic distortions.
3. Creditors' decision-making errors lead to significant losses. Due to issues in the accounting information disclosed by listed companies, banks may unknowingly provide loans to financially weak firms, resulting in a high volume of non-performing loans and posing significant risks to the financial system.
4. Loss of state-owned assets. When decision-makers rely on doctored accounting reports, they are unable to effectively detect or prevent the loss of state-owned assets. As a result, the problem of asset loss becomes more severe. In China, audits of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises revealed massive losses, reaching tens of billions of yuan annually.
In the evolution of China's securities market and during deepening corporate reforms, the issues surrounding accounting information disclosure by listed companies have drawn extensive attention from investors, creditors, regulatory authorities, and accounting standard-setting bodies. Given the complexity and diversity of these issues, there is a need to determine how to identify problems in disclosure, under what circumstances they arise, and what measures regulators and policy-makers should take to mitigate them.
The article employs game theory analysis to explore the root causes, motivations, and equilibrium outcomes of these issues. It divides into three main sections:
1. The first section discusses the existing problems in accounting information disclosure by listed companies, highlighting the inaccuracies, incompleteness, and tardiness of information.
2. The second section delves into a detailed game theory analysis of accounting information disclosure. It examines the interaction between the providers (companies) and users (investors) of accounting reports, competition among companies, and the dynamic between regulators and the companies.
3. The third part proposes solution strategies, drawing on the conclusions of the game theory analysis. It focuses on enhancing corporate governance structures, establishing effective incentive and constraint mechanisms, and strengthening media supervision as key areas for addressing the identified problems.
Keywords: Listed Companies, Game Theory, Entrepreneurial Market
This research underscores the critical role of accurate accounting information in facilitating effective decision-making, market functioning, and regulatory oversight. By applying game theory, it offers insights into the motivations behind the problems and suggests practical measures to improve transparency and accountability in the listed company sector. Ultimately, this work contributes to the ongoing discourse on enhancing the integrity and reliability of accounting information in the corporate world.
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