2 Tsinghua Science and Technology
to prevent IP spoofing from outside of an AS according
to SAVA architecture.
The resource public key infrastructure (RPKI)
[9]
, as
the major trust anchor of the Internet promoted by IETF
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group,
is constructed to solve the problem of authenticity of
routing origination. The first application of RPKI—
route origination authorization (ROA)
[10]
—naturally
provides a built-in stipulation where ASes can be the
hosts for a given IP prefix. Therefore, we envision
that data source security for inter-AS source address
validation (SAV) will also benefit from the RPKI system
indirectly.
In this paper, by probing the substance of RPKI,
we creatively integrate inter-AS SAV into RPKI
and propose RPKI based Inter-AS Source Protection
(RISP). RISP simplify the logic of inter-AS SAV
by decoupling the function of it, making the system
focusing on the validation while RPKI focusing on
the rest. Through analyzing, such reciprocal attribute
brings inter-AS SAV a more concise and modularized
structure, which improves the filtering efficiency
referring to the traditional ways. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that tries to solve
inter-AS SAV within the RPKI architecture. The
key contributions in this paper can be summarized as
follows.
1. Decoupled Structure: RISP is an RPKI-based
and RPKI-decoupled method. RISP adequately
leverages the trust basis provided by RPKI and
works well in the partial deployment of RPKI.
2. Source-oriented Protection: By valuing
“protections” over “validation”, RISP provides
deployer ASes a more credible protection for IP
addresses they own, triggering decent incentives
for themselves.
3. Filtering Efficiency: RISP benefits from the
power-law theorem of the Internet to a large extent,
achieving high defensive performance with only
small deployment rate.
Through mathematical analysis and related
experiments, it is shown that RISP brings deployer
ASes decent incentives with modest resource
consumption, and realizes performance improvements
and bandwidth savings over typical cryptography based
way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 covers related work. Then we intensively
detail RISP in Section 3. This is followed by
the evaluation in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
security issues, and concluding remarks are presented
in Section 6.
2 Related Work
2.1 Inter-AS Source Address Validation
Inter-AS SAV methodology that implementing at
Internet routers can be primarily classified into
two types: routing-based validation and labeling-
based validation. Routing-based validation verify
source address by restricting the feasible incoming
interfaces for each IP space according to the routing
information. However, in most cases, routing-
based validations neglect benefits for deployed ASes
themselves, resulting in weak incentives in deployment.
Besides, in practice, false positives is another challenge
for routing-based method because of the dynamics
of inter-domain routing. Labeling-based validation
usually involves cryptography, and it verifies source
address by an exclusive customized label. Although
methods in this way introduce extra cost in validating
these cryptographic labels, it offers the deployers
higher incentives and flexibility even if these ASes are
nonadjacent. Challenges for this method mainly focus
on the optimizations of the labeling algorithm and key
distribution. In this regard, labeling-based validation
usually presents a trade-off between flexibility and
complexity.
In this section, we present the main technologies
used for each type of the methods in order to pinpoint
both characteristics and the lessons that should be taken
away.
2.1.1 Routing-based Validation
Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE)
[11]
, on
the behalf of this kind of method, attempts to provide
a new protocol to notify each routers the potential
incoming interfaces for each source address space.
However, SAVE only works if it is fully deployed,
lacking mechanisms for partial deployment.
Different from SAVE which depending on
collaboration between numerous ASes, Inter Domain
Packet Filters (IDPF)
[12]
deployers construct a
validation table by individually backward predicting
from BGP update messages. Although IDPF act
as a classical representative which inheriting the