Z. Y. Di
10.4236/jss.2019.74029 363 Open Journal of Social Sciences
tant position of investment activities, it has quickly become the core of modern
enterprise finance theory research. The early investment theory came into being
in the 1870s. With the continuous improvement and development of investment
theory, the classic capital structure theory and corporate governance theory were
widely used in investment fields.
In recent years, the studies have greatly enriched people’s understanding of
enterprise investment behavior. These studies and explanations are based on the
assumptions of rational man; however, the reality challenges this strict assump-
tion. A large number of psychological studies have shown that human behavioral
decisions are usually at a level that is not completely rational. In reality, the main
manifestations of cognitive bias are: excessive optimism, confirmation bias, loss
avoidance, control illusion, group effect behavior, etc. Too much belief in one’s
ability to judge and to overestimate the probability of success is the most com-
mon and serious overconfidence of knowledge. Overconfidence can be found in
many work areas, such as engineers, doctors, nurses, lawyers, managers and en-
trepreneurs, but research has found that managers are more likely to be over-
confident than the normal person.
The market economic system is not perfect in our country; listed compa-
nies still need a large number of inefficient investment. The pursuit of diver-
sification will lead to overinvestment due to the lax supervision of funds
within listed companies. Overinvestment is not only a waste of resources, but
also will suffer the interests of investors and enterprise. In view of such
prominent problems in listed companies, scholars began to conduct extensive
research. However, the traditional theoretical framework of implicit manager
assumption was mainly adopted to elaborate the research on the basis of
principal-agent conflict and promote the use of incentive measures to coor-
dinate the interests of managers and shareholders. However, most enterprises
have agency problems, and it is difficult to solve them effectively from the
perspective of incentive mechanism. In the context of a market economy
dominated by the state, irrational behaviors of enterprise managers in actual
investment decisions often occur. The irrational behavior of managers usually
damages enterprise value and restricts the existence and development of listed
companies theoretically. Because managers have the psychological characte-
ristics of cognitive deviation, they cannot accurately carry out self-evaluation,
and it is difficult for them to achieve the effect by taking incentive measures.
This shows that the inefficient investment of governance managers should
start from the cognitive characteristics of decision makers. From the existing
research in China, there are relatively few studies on how the irrational beha-
vior of managers affects the decision-making behavior of companies. Moreo-
ver, there is no complete theoretical framework for the research on the irra-
tional behavior of managers from the perspective of behavioral finance.
Whether we can use foreign research methods to study the listed companies
in China is worth discussing.
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