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Open Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 8, 145-155

http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp

ISSN Online: 2163-9442

ISSN Print: 2163-9434

DOI:

10.4236/ojpp.2018.83011 May 9, 2018 145 Open Journal of Philosophy

Spinoza and the Relativity of Evil in the World

Muhammad Kamal

Asia Institute the University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

Abstract

This article analyses the problem of evil in the world in the context of Spin

za’s philosophical discourse. It deals with an important and urgent question: is

there evil in the world or not? Drawing upon Spinoza’s interpretation of the

relationship between God and the world, I consider this dilemma by conce

trating upon the pantheistic elements of his philosophy. I have discussed how

Spinoza develops his arguments for the relativity of evil and its objective

non-existence. This solution is derived

from the way he identifies substance as

the sole reality with God. I have also compared Spinoza’s ideas with those of

Plotinus by highlighting similarities in their respective understandings of the

problem of evil.

Keywords

Substance, Evil, Relativity, Immanence, Transcendence

1. Introduction

Spinoza’s philosophy revolves around the notion of a single substance. Substance

is portrayed as the reality upon which the existence of everything stands. In this

respect, its relation to the world can be defined in terms of identity and differ-

ence, in the sense that substance and the world are same and diverse. The world

is the product of substance and yet also different from it. But the difference be-

tween substance and its product does not bring about an atypical reality.

With this portrayal of the nature of reality in Spinoza’s pantheism the most

enigmatic challenge is the existence of evil in the world. This challenge origi-

nates from the account of substance as the sole source of the being of all things.

It is therefore natural to begin our discussion with the notion of substance and

analyse its relation with the world, moving on next to an examination of the ex-

istence of evil in light of Spinoza’s idea of the singularity of substance and its

all-inclusiveness.

How to cite this paper:

Kamal, M. (2018).

Spinoza and the Relativity of Evil in the

World

Open Journal of Philosophy, 8

145

-155.

https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2018.83011

Received:

February 19, 2018

Accepted:

May 6, 2018

Published:

May 9, 2018

8 by author and

Scientific

Research Publishing Inc.

This work is licensed under the Creative

Commons Attribution International

License (CC BY

4.0).

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Open Access

M. Kamal

DOI:

10.4236/ojpp.2018.83011 146 Open Journal of Philosophy

By reducing everything to an infinite substance, the problem of evil in the

world may appear more complex. This problem cannot be solved correctly un-

less we first understand the core of Spinoza’s philosophy. It should also be re-

membered that from the outset Spinoza’s account of the existence of evil in the

world is in disparity with fundamental Judeo-Christian dogmas of faith and the

paradigm of creation

exnihilo

. Yet this disparity only serves to render any dis-

cussion on the topic more interesting and challenging, because the problem of

evil is not only philosophical. The question of its existence is of paramount im-

portance for philosophers as well as theologians. As such, I attempt to examine

the reality of evil in the world and discuss how the notion of substance as the

source of the world repudiates the ontological possibility of evil.

2. Spinoza’s Worldview and Substance

Spinoza’s metaphysics begins with the assertion of the existence of a single sub-

stance as the concrete ground of all things. This single substance is also identi-

fied with God. Substance is defined as something that is conceived through itself,

as something that exists in and of itself independent of the conception of any-

thing else for its existence. Thus, it is self-caused and has no external source for

its existence; “I understand substance (

substantia

) to be that which is in itself

and it conceived through itself: I mean that, the conception of which does not

depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.”

(Spinoza, 1970: Def. 3, p. 1) Thereby, substance is uncreated and its essence nec-

essarily includes its existence; “I understand that to be a cause of itself (

causasui

)

whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless

existing.” (Spinoza, 1970: Def. 1, p. 1) When we define the essence of substance

we simply refer to its existence, because the existence of substance is inseparable

from its essence. Whatever is

causa sui

brings about its own existence. There will

be neither an ontological nor logical distinction between its essence and its exis-

tence. Its existence, for example, cannot be prior or posterior to its essence and

vice versa

. Such a kind of being must be infinite and eternal, otherwise its exis-

tence would be limited by something other than itself, which would make it fi-

nite.

In dealing with the number of substances, Spinoza also insists upon the exis-

tence of a single substance. If there is more than one substance, then they should

be either identical or different. If they were identical then they wouldn’t be dis-

tinguishable, and if they were different with nothing in common reciprocally,

then one could not be the cause of the other. But having two substances with the

same attributes would be meaningless, because they wouldn’t be different in es-

sence, in this case, they are not two substances but one. If two substances possess

different attributes, they wouldn’t be the same in essence and they would limit

each other, then both becoming finite, which is in contradiction with the defini-

tion of substance as something infinite. There must, therefore, be only one sub-

stance as an infinite being possessing infinite attributes. In

Ethics

, Spinoza re-

marks that “Nor two or more substances can have the same attribute (Prop. 5),

M. Kamal

DOI:

10.4236/ojpp.2018.83011 147 Open Journal of Philosophy

and it appertains to the nature of substance that it should exist (Prop. 7). It must

therefore exist either finitely of infinitely. But not finitely. For (Def. 2) it would

then be limited by some other substance of the same nature which also of neces-

sity must exist (Prop. 7): and then two substances would be granted having the

same attribute, which is absurd (Prop. 5). It will exist, therefore, infinitely.”

(Spinoza, 1970: Prop. 8, Proof, p. 4). Thus, there cannot be more than one sub-

stance having different attributes or sharing the same attributes.

Substance, as an infinite being, has attributes, which are infinite in number

and kind. Of these infinite attributes, only two are known to the human mind,

namely the attributes of thought and extension. This is a clear departure from

the Cartesian tradition with which Spinoza was acquainted where these two

attributes are called substances and exclude one another. For Spinoza, thought

and extension with other unknown infinite attributes belong to a single sub-

stance. They can neither exist by themselves nor become substance.

Substance exists in such a way that it can be identified with God. This is a log-

ical consequence of Spinoza’s definition of substance as something infinite and

uncreated, because in a theistic philosophical system only God possesses infinite

qualities, “God (

Deus

) I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a

substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and

infinite essence.” (Spinoza, 1970: Def. 6, p. 1). In Corollary 1, Proposition 14,

Spinoza states, “Hence it distinctly follows that God is one alone, i.e., there is

none like him, or in the nature of things only one substance can be granted, and

that is absolutely infinite, as we intimated in the Note of Prop. 10.” Accordingly,

God is a single substance with infinite attributes and modes, at the same time, it

is indivisible. If substance is divisible, its parts will either sustain the nature of

substance or they won’t. If they sustain the nature of substance, there will be

plurality of substance. If they didn’t sustain the nature of substance, then sub-

stance would no longer exist and hence becoming finite. Therefore, substance is

indivisible and has no parts (Spinoza, 1970: Prop. 13, Proof, p. 10). In this way,

indivisibility preserves the unity and singularity of substance.

This account of substance as having infinite attributes and its ensuing identi-

fication with God is imperative for our discussion of the existence of evil in the

world because it is the core of Spinoza’s metaphysical system. Richard Mason

points out that God is not apprehended as a transcendent existent, or as a being

among others but as the whole reality (Richard Mason, 1999: p. 37). God, as the

only substance, has infinite attributes, and the attributes constitute His/Her di-

vine essence. These attributes manifest themselves as modes to produce all ex-

isting entities. Thereby, everything would become a part of God, “Whatever is, is

in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.” (Spinoza, 1970:

Prop. 15, p. 11) Can we say that God is the totality of existing entities or tran-

scends them? Since God has infinite attributes, it would be problematic to insist

upon the nature of God in terms of totality, but then it is all-inclusive. There is

nothing outside God’s existence. In dealing with this problem, Harry A. Wolfson

holds the view that Spinoza’s God denotes the

summum genus

, containing all

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