vi The Art of War in the Network Age
2.3. Confronting the distinctive aspects
of military revolutions ................................ 39
2.3.1. An anhistorical RMA? ........................... 39
2.3.2. Breaks and discontinuities ......................... 43
Chapter 3. A Paradigm Shift ............................ 49
3.1. A strategic consensus around the
“paradigm shift” .................................... 49
3.1.1. Paradigm pluralities ............................ 50
3.1.2. The place of politics: scientific-rational
and historical paradigms ............................. 52
3.1.3. The question of levels of engagement .................. 54
3.1.4. A rethinking of strategy as an art ..................... 58
3.2. Strategy of means and RMA .......................... 63
3.2.1. A hidden revolution? RMA
and genetic strategy ................................ 64
3.2.2. A failed revolution? RMA
and industrial strategy ............................... 68
Chapter 4. Understanding (1): Piercing the
Fog of War in Fluid Spaces ............................ 75
4.1. Strategy of fluid spaces ............................. 77
4.1.1. The fluid and the solid ........................... 78
4.1.2. SAGE, the first network-centric system ................. 79
4.2. Fluidifying global spaces? ........................... 85
4.2.1. Figures of the fluidification of
aerospatial spaces .................................. 87
4.2.2. Fluidification by reticulation ....................... 89
4.2.3. Operating in mixed spaces: generating
political effect .................................... 92
Chapter 5. Understanding (2):
Fluidifying the Solid? ................................ 99
5.1. The electronic battlefield ............................ 101
5.1.1. The Vietnam War .............................. 102
5.1.2. The European model of the RMA .................... 104
5.2. The fragmentation of intelligence ....................... 110
5.2.1. Fragmenting and network-centering ................... 110
5.2.2. The network-centric man ......................... 114
5.2.3. Uncertainty and new armies
of the old regime .................................. 123
