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Page iii
A Course in Game Theory
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Page iv
Copyright
©
1994 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic. or mechanical means
(including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the
publisher.
This book was typeset by the authors, who are greatly indebted to Donald Knuth (the creator of T
E
X), Leslie
Lamport (the creator of LAT
E
X), and Eberhard Mattes (the creator of emT
E
X) for generously putting superlative
software in the public domain. Camera-ready copy was produced by Type 2000, Mill Valley, California, and the
book was printed and bound by The Maple
-
Vail Book Manufacturing Group, Binghamton, New York.
Osborne, Martin J.
A course in game theory I Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-15041-7.—ISBN 0-262-65040-1 (pbk.)
1. Game theory. I. Rubinstein, Ariel. II. Title.
HB 144.0733 1994
658.4'0353-dc20 94-8308
CIP
Fifth printing, 1998
Page v
CONTENTS
Preface
xi
1
Introduction
1
1.1 Game Theory
1
1.2 Games and Solutions
2
1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium
3
1.4 Rational Behavior
4
1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations
5
1.6 Bounded Rationality
6
1.7 Terminology and Notation
6
Notes
8
I
Strategic Games
9
2
Nash Equilibrium
11
2.1 Strategic Games
11
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
14
2.3 Examples
15
2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
19
2.5 Strictly Competitive Games
21
2.6 Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect Information
24
Notes
29
Page vi
3
Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium
31
3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
31
3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
37
3.3 Correlated Equilibrium
44
3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium
48
Notes
51
4
Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions
53
4.1 Rationalizability
53
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
58
4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions
62
Notes
64
5
Knowledge and Equilibrium
67
5.1 A Model of Knowledge
67
5.2 Common Knowledge
73
5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree?
75
5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts
76
5.5 The Electronic Mail Game
81
Notes
84
II
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
87
6
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
89
6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information
89
6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
97
6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game
101
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资源评论
- Doormaster2017-09-22还是原版的好~
- howardlee2013-05-11最近正在用game theory,很有参考价值
- chenqjll2012-09-14很好的教材,虽然英文版看起来有点吃力,但是还是很给力。
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